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Abstract: In this introductory essay, we explore definitions of the ‘sharing economy’, a concept
indicating both social  (relational,  communitarian)  and economic  (allocative,  profit-seeking)
aspects which appear to be in tension. We suggest combining the social and economic logics of
the  sharing  economy  to  focus  on  the  central  features  of  network  enabled,  aggregated
membership in a pool of offers and demands (for goods, services, creative expressions). This
definition  of  the  sharing  economy  distinguishes  it  from  other  related  peer-to-peer  and
collaborative forms of production. Understanding the social and economic motivations for and
implications of participating in the sharing economy is important to its regulation. Each of the
papers in this special issue contributes to knowledge by linking the social and economic aspects
of sharing economy practices to regulatory norms and mechanisms. We conclude this essay by
suggesting future research to further clarify and render intelligible the sharing economy, not as
a contradiction in terms but as an empirically observable realm of socio-economic activity.
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EDITORIAL
INTRODUCTION: WHAT ‘SHARING’?
The sharing economy is on the rise. In 2015 gross revenue from sharing economy companies
across the EU doubled from 2014 and totaled 28 billion EUR (EU, 2016) and it is estimated to
be  worth  335  billion  USD  globally  by  2025  (PriceWaterhouseCoopers,  2015).  A  third  of
Europeans have used the services of a sharing platform (EU, 2016), rising to 72% of North
Americans (Pew Research Center, 2016). Today, there is little dispute that the sharing economy
impacts lives and livelihoods and that technologies underpinning it both structure behaviour
and facilitate emerging and expanding business. Yet, as ongoing and numerous legal actions and
injunctions against companies like Uber and Airbnb across the world demonstrate1, opinion
differs on the extent to which the sharing economy should be regulated, resisted or embraced.
Similarly, there is little research into how the technological affordances and infrastructures that
underpin the sharing economy structure and shape human interactions and transactions, and,
crucially, what this means in a wider cultural or socio-economic context. This special issues
seeks to address this.
One obstacle to a deeper understanding of the ‘sharing economy’ has been ambiguity about its
definition. Sharing, which evokes familiar exchanges and intimate relationships, seems to be at
odds  with  economic  activity  driven  by  anonymous  transactions  and  rational,  rather  than
altruistic behaviour (Belk, 2010; Schor et al, 2015). Political debates about the status of sharing
economy  services  highlight  tensions  in  the  social  and  economic  dimensions  of  these  new
services. The way that society and policymakers define the sharing economy will influence how
we choose to regulate its activities. The purpose of this introduction to the special issue is firstly,
to  provide  a  definition  of  the  sharing  economy  and  secondly,  to  discuss  how  empirical
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approaches, such as the contributions to this collection, can help inform policy concerns.
In brief, we advance a definition of the sharing economy which incorporates both its social and
economic relationality. For us, the present ‘sharing economy’ is defined by the aggregation of
individual offers (of goods, labour, creative expression) into a common pool. The practice of
sharing in our proposed definition is not dependent on shared ownership or access to products
or services, since sharing economy goods may be excluded from those who do not pay. Rather it
is the shared, collective status of users who offer something of their own to the aggregated pool
which constitutes mutuality (in however weak a form).
Networked, mobile technologies make possible communication between previously anonymous
participants,  and can foster a  range of  reciprocal  and non-reciprocal  interaction.  However,
unlike gift economies where reciprocity aids in strengthening group ties, or commons-based
peer  production where  ownership  of  collaboration is  shared,  commercial  sharing economy
platforms are not held together by reciprocity or shared ownership of goods. Consumers of these
services may come and go: they may be inspired after a successful transaction to join the service
with an offer of their own, or they may not.
Sharing economy goods are typically excludable and rivalrous (for example a bicycle sharing app
which permits paying customers exclusive use of a peer’s bicycle for an appointed period of
time). Consequently, the goods exchanged in the sharing economy do not themselves constitute
a shared commons. This highlights one of the faultlines in debates about the status of sharing in
the sharing economy. In traditional societies as well as certain forms of commons-based peer
production,  the  beneficiaries  of  sharing  are  also  contributors  themselves  (that  is,  sharing
practices  are  interwoven  with  social  and  political  capital  and  group  membership).  Now,
anonymous, decentralised, peer-to-peer matchmaking replaces pre-existing social ties, leading
to new political and economic subjectivities (Schor et al., 2015; Erickson, 2015). However, as we
discuss below, social and personal motivations for taking part in aggregated sharing economy
markets remain key to their growth as well as the policies designed to regulate them. We thus
cannot ignore the social and relational features present alongside economic incentives in the
commercial sharing economy.
SOCIAL FEATURES, FROM PEER-TO-PEER TO
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION
‘Sharing’ has been a social and transactional practice long before it was coupled with ‘economy’,
of course, and is neither new to the internet nor society at large. Some have argued that the
practice of sharing is hardwired into humans as social beings and is a necessity for survival
(Price (1975) as cited in Belk, 2009, p. 715 and Nicholson, 1998). Sharing is integral to the
socialisation process that takes place from childhood in most communities. The right to decide
what  is  being  shared  and  amongst  whom  varies  culturally,  and  reflects  the  norms  and
hegemonies  within  a  given  society  (Belk,  2009;  Tomasello  et  al.,  2005,  pp.  683-4).  In
democracies with social-democratic leanings this is often imbued with social responsibility; for
example, infants in the English-speaking world learn that ‘sharing is caring’.
From early in its inception, the web was envisaged as an open space for all to share information
(The World Wide Web Foundation, 2016). In line with this, a large body of academic work
explored both reciprocal and non-reciprocal modes of sharing, motivated by a range of rewards,
such as for example explored by Barbrook (1998), Benkler (2004; 2006), Boyle (2003: 45) and
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Lessig (2008). Analyses of online sharing practices such as these focused on the peer-to-peer,
non-hierarchical features of networks of commons-based production. Digital networks appeared
to flatten hierarchies in numerous ways, such as by cutting out intermediaries and gatekeepers
that were seen as commercially-driven profiteers or restrictive of creative freedom.
It  is  precisely  these  prerequisites  for  effective  peer-to-peer  (p2p)  sharing  networks  and
communities, that have precipitated the ‘sharing economy’. With Web 2.0, the growth of the
‘sharing economy’ has been propelled by at least two factors: networked p2p communication
enabled by digital innovation on the one hand, and on the other technological advances in
online banking enabling consumers to make secure transactions and micropayments (features
that Jenkins (2004: 39) identified as facilitating ‘convergence’). The convergence between the
affordances  of  social  media  platforms and the  economic  propositions  based on sharing  of
resources and secure transactional technologies, combined with circumnavigation of traditional
intermediaries, form the foundation of what constitutes the sharing economy today and the new
commercial transnational players and gatekeepers therein (Van Dijck, 2013).
This paradox lies at the core of the debates that surround sharing economy practices today. On
the one hand the discourse – and for some, reality – of sharing resonates with community,
reciprocity,  equality,  flexibility  and  freedom  from  interference  by  intermediaries.  This  is
supported by the fact  that  non-reciprocal  sharing platforms and economies evidently work
effectively and inspire their communities.  For example, crowd-sharing practices flourish on
Freecycle  where recycled and reused goods are  exchanged in kind (Phipps,  2015).  Helpful
contributors to the Mumsnet community advise on products and activities for young families.
Crowdfunding  platforms  like  Kickstarter  and  Indiegogo  do  the  work  of  arts  funders  and
enterprise offices (Sørensen, 2013). It is of course important to note that both crowdwork and
the reasons for engaging in such ventures predate the internet. For example, patronage of the
arts goes back to at least antiquity and operated on a near industrial scale in Renaissance Italy.
The first Oxford English dictionary was co-created by a group of contributors in 1858 and long
preceded  Wikipedia.  Today  and  then,  these  practices  and  participation  in  sharing  and
collaborative ventures are motivated by a variety of factors. For example, patronage; the wish to
‘do good’; the feeling of belonging to a community; and the social status or capital accrued by
the act of sharing (Benkler, 2012, 2014; Belk, 2009; Mollick, 2014). In the case of new sharing
economy platforms -  even when sharing is  mediated by a  transaction and occurs between
strangers - many of the same intrinsic motivations appear to remain (Phipps, 2015).
Although on many sharing economy platforms social ties between participants are weak or non-
existent, a discourse of sociality continues to be adopted by commercial networks and players in
the  market  (Lury,  2015).  Notions  of  collaboration,  freedom  and  flexibility  are  offered  in
response to challenges which include poor working conditions, liability and lack of regulation
(Newsnight, BBC2, 2016). These practical and discursive dissonances around sharing economies
complicate the analysis of their dynamics.
ECONOMIC FEATURES: PRIVATE GOODS, CLUB GOODS
OR COMMON RESOURCES?
Economic definitions of  the sharing economy focus on the efficient allocation of  resources
through mutual agreement by networked participants to grant access to goods or services they
own. Economic ‘gains from sharing’ are realised as previously underutilised private goods are
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made available  to  more consumers (Fremstad,  2016).  Sharing economy exchanges may be
reciprocal  or  non-reciprocal,  however  an  important  distinguishing  feature  is  that  the
aggregated, p2p organisation of sharing platforms does not require users to return an equivalent
product or service to the pool. One could choose to always remain a consumer, or a provider, of
goods. Highlighting the consumptive, coordinated market character of the practice, the sharing
economy has also been closely identified with ‘collaborative consumption’ (Belk, 2014) or ‘access
economy’ (Eckhardt & Bardhi, 2015).
At its core, the sharing economy consists of an agreement between participants to contribute an
owned resource (labour, goods, creative expression) to a common pool from which others may
draw, with or without a commercial transaction. The benefits to the contributing participant are
potentially (i) a share in the reduction of transaction costs2 achieved by collectively aggregating
the exchange, (ii) access to a larger market attracted by the size of the aggregated offer. The
customer in a sharing economy transaction likewise benefits from reduced costs (i), while also
being able to browse a larger collection of offers (ii).
Operators of sharing economy businesses are engaged in a platform business model in which
they  generate  value  via  their  contribution  to  (i),  by  innovating  new systems  to  carry  out
transactions swiftly and efficiently between participants, and they benefit from network effects
(ii) which allow them to capture increasing value (profit) as long as the combined price of the
participant’s offer plus the platform fee is enticing to consumers attracted by the size of the
market (See Russo & Stasi, this issue; also see Baden-Fuller & Haefliger, 2013). This business
model is not fundamentally new, closely resembling the physical swap-meet business model
which  pre-dates  the  internet.  Digital  networked  communication  further  enables  sharing
economy businesses to decentralise the exchange (both in time and space), benefiting from
indirect network effects and economies of scale.
Although peer-to-peer networks enable communication and exchange, they present a risk to
platform operators: there is little to stop new collectives from forming around cheap and widely-
available matchmaking tools. Commercial sharing platforms must constantly seek to reduce
transaction costs between participants and customers while also ensuring the aggregated offer is
competitive. Paradoxically, sharing economy businesses are incentivised to keep participants
(sharers) from communicating with one another, as this could provide a basis for collective
action  or  the  emergence  of  competing  services.  This  logic  runs  counter  to  traditionally
sustainable means of governing common-pool resources, where close ties and communication
between providers and appropriators are crucial to sustaining governance (Ostrom, 1990).
The  business  model  logic  of  the  commercial  sharing  economy  helps  to  explain  cognitive
dissonance in definitions which seem alien from everyday experiences of ‘sharing’ (in which, for
example, community ties are strengthened via repeat interaction). Sharing economy businesses
are  aggregated  but  not  necessarily  collective.  The  mutuality  fostered  by  sharing  economy
platforms is that of membership in a market, not shared possession of a good (See Belk, 2010:
79). We suggest that for sharing economy platforms like Airbnb and Uber, the shared possession
which constitutes the commons is not the softness of the beds or the cleanliness of the taxis, but
membership itself (who gets to drive, who gets to ride, etc.). This may explain preoccupation
with self-regulatory rating systems rather than external controls on the quality of goods or
public interest concerns.
One of the dangers posed by the sharing economy is that regulators and citizens confuse sharing
economy goods with public or semi-public goods. Public goods are non-excludable, and are
therefore ‘shared’ among users by default. As a result of non-excludability, public goods are
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frequently under-produced by society, making it a desirable aim of regulators to provide them.
Sharing economy goods are used by many but excludable, making them more like club goods
(Buchanan, 1965; Fremstad, 2016). Sharing economy services may optimise the use of a durable
good or an underemployed worker by making them available to more consumers, but those who
cannot pay are excluded from use. Importantly, the algorithms, trademarks and technologies
that make up sharing economy platforms themselves are private goods, protected by corporate
secrecy, contract and intellectual property rights.
REGULATORY CHALLENGES
The changes in social and economic relations implicated by the sharing economy highlighted
above have generated particular regulatory challenges. These include issues related to working
conditions, trust, risk, liability and individual agency.
Labour / working conditions: One claim made by platform operators is that participants are not
‘employees’ but something else, like ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ (Schor et al., 2015; Rogers, 2016).
Participants contribute freely to the common pool and can withdraw their offer at any time, so
in that sense, they are not employees (companies like Airbnb and Lyft have their own, actual
employees who manage the platforms and try to extend the territorial reach of the brand).
However, due to precariousness introduced by global systemic crises, sharing economy activity
could substitute for what feels like ‘work’ for many who participate (Cherry, 2016; Walker,
2015). In the absence of traditional permanent employment, sharing economy gig work may
constitute a larger proportion of income for some participants. And from the point of view of
customers of services like TaskRabbit or Fiverr, the services offered are equivalent to labour. As
highlighted in this literature, a major outcome of the change in relationship between worker and
employer in the sharing economy is  that  participants  are exposed to greater  risk,  reduced
benefits and lower job security. Consequently regulation may be desirable to protect workers
rights and well-being (De Stefano, 2016).
Trust:  With  reduced  social  ties  compared  to  other  kinds  of  shared  commons,  a  central
regulatory  concern  for  sharing  economy  services  is  trust  between  participants.  Relative
anonymity and substitutability across the range of offers means that buyers and sellers typically
have less information than they would in a traditional exchange. As a response many sharing
economy platforms have introduced rating systems (effectively distributing part of the cost of
regulating the platform to members). User ratings are problematic in a number of ways: (i) their
capacity to be manipulated by dishonest or malicious participants (Lee, 2015) (ii) related, the
lack of transparency in the way ratings are assigned, which could conceal bias on the part of the
commercial  platform,  (iii)  their  simplicity  as  single-digit  reporting  devices,  masking  other
important contextual  information (Parigi  et  al,  2013);  (iv)  alternatively their  intrusion into
private aspects of participants’ lives and disciplinary function. Even assuming that user rating
systems  can  be  well-defended  from  malicious  attack  and  do  not  mask  systemic  biases
introduced  by  commercial  interests,  the  removal  of  traditional  commercial  parties  from
exchanges means that those responsibilities must be displaced elsewhere. The trust represented
in user  ratings might  be significant,  but  the risk is  disproportionately  borne by individual
participants.
Risk  and  liability:  In  crowdworking  platforms,  considerable  legal  liability  is  displaced  to
participants and users themselves. For example Lyft, Uber and similar platforms require that
participants have their own driver’s licence and insurance. Requirements for criminal records
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checks  and other  status  checks  vary  between countries  and companies.  For  Airbnb,  home
insurance needs to be provided by individual participants. Similarly, there are no health and
safety inspections and although, for example, Airbnb ‘encourages’ hosts to install  smoke or
carbon  monoxide  gas  detectors  they  do  not  require  proof  for  this.  Also,  there  are  no
requirements to provide a clean criminal record for hosts or guests and, potentially, violent
offenders could be host or guests (Airbnb, 2016a; 2016b). This poses obvious risks to both
workers and customers. Further to this, there is limited clarity on how the continued status of
permits, insurance, and qualifications are updated, monitored or maintained.3
This shift from corporate to private responsibility also has implications for the provision for
diverse groups in society. It becomes the prerogative of individual service provider whether to
provide adequate wheelchair access to Airbnb rooms, or for ride-sharing drivers to cover rural
areas or cater for children, as described in Leiren and Aarhaug’s article (2016, this issue). All of
these  factors  have  obvious  public  interest  implications  that  have  not  yet  been  adequately
addressed, either by the platforms themselves or by national legislators.
Agency: Related closely to the above, the status of individual and community agency in the
sharing economy has been raised by a number of academic commentators (Rahman, 2015).
There are two dimensions to these critiques. Firstly, individual participants in sharing economy
networks  are  limited  in  their  choice  about  who  to  transact  with  and  how.  Platforms  are
standardised and anonymised (to take advantage of the efficiencies of technological convergence
discussed above). Prices are normally constrained by platform operators and can sometimes be
altered by algorithms (e.g. surge pricing) over which participants have little control. With the
presence of network effects and in the absence of competition (or portability) between services,
participants may find themselves locked into a single platform and subject to unfavourable
conditions.  Secondly,  the  ability  of  communities  to  impose national  or  local  regulation on
sharing economy platforms is reduced due to their novelty, their reliance on non-transparent
algorithmic  systems  and  their  global  reach.  In  the  case  of  Uber  and  other  ride-sharing
applications, one outcome has been that certain municipalities have chosen to outright ban the
services from operating, rather than be able to reach an agreement with the platform satisfying
the local regulatory context.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS SPECIAL ISSUE
Each contribution to this special issue provides a lens on economic and social dimensions of
sharing economy practice. Articles are focused on issues of concern rather than individual case
studies of platforms. The issues of concern covered by the contributions in this issue are the
ontological status of shared goods, the conditions of crowdworking, regulation of trust between
strangers, definition of relevant markets for competition regulation and European media policy
concerns.
As discussed above, some commercial sharing economy platforms have linked their brands to
affectively meaningful offline analogues (e.g., Bed and Breakfast accommodation or informal
ride-shares). The ontological status of goods transacted in the sharing economy has implications
for how they should be regulated. A central concern for research on the sharing economy is the
extent to which the market which is virtualised through peer-to-peer communication rivals
other markets constrained by geography and other factors. What features does Airbnb share
with a traditional bed-and-breakfast? To what extent can Uber’s service be compared to the
licensed taxi  driving profession? The contribution by Merethe Dotterud Leiren and Jørgen
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Aarhaug shows that the difference between taxi and non-taxi is not simply a semantic trick to
evade  classification  and  resultant  regulation.  Rather,  as  the  authors  demonstrate  through
interviews with providers on both sides of the divide, the ‘taxi’ signifies a range of professional,
communitarian and public interest effects which are not present or are altered in the virtual taxi
service brought to life by sharing economy platforms.
In their contribution, Ayad Al-Ani and Stefan Stumpp provide a typology of P2P crowdworking
platforms. These range from anonymised platforms catering to efficiencies of scale in unskilled
work such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, to crowdsourcing platforms offering efficiencies of
scope such as InnoCentive. Employment arrangements may be flexible or more formalised and
regular, depending on the nature of the work. The authors report on results of a new survey
conducted  with  crowdworkers  on  the  international  platform  jovoto,  measuring  workers’
motivations  and  concerns.  Supported  by  these  data,  the  authors  explore  whether  existing
regulatory  frameworks  are  relevant  for  workers  in  the  sharing  economy  or  whether
organisations like trade unions could potentially play a role in safeguarding their rights. A key
finding is that participants report strong intrinsic motivations for participation: ‘learning’ and
‘fun’ are invoked more frequently than ‘money’ by the sample of creative crowdworkers.
Examining trust in online exchange of piratical material, Roberto Tietzmann and Liana Gross
Furini  provide an empirical  window on anonymous,  commons-based peer  production in  a
setting where there is no commercial platform intermediary. The authors analyse the way that
community consensus formed around naming conventions on a piratical file-sharing website.
Although trust between participants is assumed to be low in anonymous, online communities,
particularly  when  illegal  infringement  is  involved,  this  research  unearths  incentives  and
mechanisms by which stable and sustainable practices are formed. The paper offers key insights
for  sharing  economy  researchers,  offering  new  data  on  the  rate  of  cooperative  and  non-
cooperative behaviour under adverse conditions. These insights point the way toward future
research to assess and improve trust mechanisms in more formal sharing economy settings,
which often rely on peer-to-peer monitoring (ratings) and the possibility of sanctions by the
platform provider. In conditions where those mechanisms are unavailable or inappropriate,
other commons-based norms may offer alternatives to coordination.
Considering sharing economy platforms from a competition law perspective, Francesco Russo
and Maria Luisa Stasi argue in their paper for a more systematic definition of relevant markets
covered by sharing economy platforms. The authors suggest that particularly in the case of two-
sided markets characterised by network effects, competition authorities should consider not
only  disruption  on  traditional  markets  (for  example  taxis  or  hotels),  but  should  examine
competition  between  platforms  where  offers  are  supplied.  Specifying  their  relationship  to
existing markets in order to effectively regulate their new services and markets within current
legislative frameworks. Approaching the issue from a legal perspective, Russo and Stasi argue in
their paper for the necessity of defining the markets covered by the sharing economy and their
relationship to existing markets in order to effectively regulate their new services within current
legislative frameworks. In sharing economies where network effects play a key role, competition
law becomes particularly pertinent.
Exploring  European  media  policy  in  the  making,  Ibrus  and  Rohn’s  paper  centres  on  the
traditional  media  industry  and  the  evolution  of  the  European  Union’s  Audiovisual  Media
Services Directive (AVMSD). Ibrus and Rohn demonstrate how defining what a media company
is and how production and distribution are understood, becomes crucial for effective regulation,
especially  when  seeking  to  legislate  for  diverse  new  services  and  platforms  in  the  media
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industries. In their paper, the authors explore the implications of including online video sharing
platforms  in  the  proposed  AVMSD.  Video  sharing  platforms,  and  in  particular  YouTube
increasingly operate like broadcasters and distributors, with multiple channels and premium
ad-free subscription options (such as YouTube Red). Yet, where VOD services like Netflix and
Amazon Prime are included in the legalisation by the AVMSD, video sharing platforms are
currently not regulated by the AVMSD but fall under the eCommerce Directive.4Ibrus and Rohn
argue that  further  inclusion of  transnational  sharing platforms like  YouTube in  the  newly
proposed AVMSD (proposed on 25 May 2016) would undermine the AVMSD legislative power.
The pooled, aggregated offer of user-generated content on services like YouTube challenges
traditional  and  existing  broadcast  regulation,  precisely  because  it  is  user-generated,
crowdsourced and shared. Including these platforms in the Directive effectively undermines the
protection of European production and content quotas - the very quotas that the new AVMSD
directive is set out to safeguard.
CONCLUSIONS
By 2025 the  sharing  economy is  expected  to  generate  335  billion  USD in  global  revenue
according to PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates.5 It will permeate a wide and diverse range of
service industries and sectors, from finance, transport, accommodation, media, and secretarial
services to creative production and software.
This  will  impact  the  composition  and  constitution  of  new  and  established  industries,  the
production of  goods and services,  the conditions of  workers and the customers and users.
Consequently it affects policy on all these levels. The collection of papers in this issue of Internet
Policy Review explore some of the main policy implications, shortcomings and needs in this
multifaceted,  complex  and evolving  landscape.  The  sharing  economy is  a  growing  area  of
productivity, innovation and industry, but maybe also a growing concern. In all the papers in
this issue the authors note the dissonance between the connotations and ideals of ‘sharing’ and
the ways these practices play out in a market context where the emphasis is very much on
‘economy’.
As a consequence, approaches to studying the sharing economy will need to take account of
social as well as economic aspects. The mutuality implied by shared membership in aggregated
platforms invites sociological precision. What are the personal motivations, group dynamics,
and social norms that govern membership and breathe life into these markets? Importantly,
how are the costs and benefits of mutuality shared between members and platform operators?
Economic questions concern not only the effects of sharing economy practices for established
industries and society as a whole (these will continue to be important). We also need to better
understand  the  economic  relations  between  participants  in  different  configurations  of  the
sharing  economy  and  competitive  dynamics  between  platform  service  providers  and  new
entrants.
As it grows in size and scope, the sharing economy will undoubtedly attract further attention
from policy studies researchers. Throughout the contributions to this special issue there is an
implicit  -  and  sometimes  explicit  -  movement  towards  self-organisation,  regulation  and
legislation. This drive is evident across communities; from supposedly unregulated and anarchic
pirate sites as described by Tietzmann and Furini to cross-territory European Union media
regulation, as discussed by Ibrus and Rohn. This regulatory impulse exists alongside market
transactions and exchanges which take place on these platforms. Discussion around the policy
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implications, requirements and needs in relation to the sharing economy have just begun.
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FOOTNOTES
1. For example, in March 2015, the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt ruled against Uber and
upheld a ban in Germany of the UberPOP service. See LG Frankfurt, docket no. 3-08 O 136/14.
The courts in Spain have referred 4 questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) asking for clarification of the status of Uber as a transport service or an information
society service. See Asociación Professional Elite Taxi, Case C-434/15. Similar cases are
currently before the courts in Denmark in 2016.
2. Baldia (2013) summarises transaction costs as the ‘search costs, bargaining costs, and
enforcement costs of entering into a transaction’ between parties. In the context of the current
sharing economy, lowering transaction costs is achieved through automated, geolocative
matchmaking, standardisation of offers and instant electronic payment, among other features.
3. Corporate responsibility can be shifted to individual workers and the providers of this service.
Phipps (2015) describes how a traffic accident involving an Uber car was deemed the
responsibility of the driver and not the company and only after several cases of rape were
reported in the global press did a clean criminal record become a requirement for drivers of
Uber cars.
4. The newly proposed AVMSD does not include video sharing platforms in its definition of
providers of ‘TV-like’ services and therefore not is its legislation, but it does propose to regulate
video sharing platforms in respect to protection of children.
5. See PricewaterhouseCoopers (2015) The sharing economy - sizing the revenue opportunity
Accessed online:
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/about/global-annual-review-2015/colliding-megatrends/the-shari
ng-economy.html
